Abstract. We consider a model of debt management, where a sovereign state trade some bonds to service the debt with a pool of risk-neutral competitive foreign investors. At each time, the government decides which fraction of the gross domestic product (GDP) must be used to repay the debt, and how much to devaluate its currency. Both these operations have the effect to reduce the actual size of the debt, but have a social cost in terms of welfare sustainability. Moreover, at any time the sovereign state can declare bankruptcy by paying a correspondent bankruptcy cost. We show that this optimization problems admits an equilibrium solution, leading to bankruptcy or to a stationary state, depending on the initial conditions.
Introduction
According to US Senate Levin-Coburn Report [10] , the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] , which originated the worldwide Great Recession of [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] and to the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012, and whose effects are still present in many countries, "was not a natural disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial products, undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The first part of the report analyze some topic cases of (1) High Risk Lending; (2) Regulatory Failure; (3) Inflated Credit Ratings; (4) Investment Bank Abuses. In the final recommendation of the report, a whole section is devoted to the management of high risk lending, in order to prevent abuses.
In the Eurozone, the crisis -whose consequences lasted until 2016 -took the form of a speculative attack to the sovereign debt of some EU countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), but also strongly affects also two major economic powers like Italy and France. The undertaken actions of the EU governments to face the crisis had very high social costs, leading also to an heavy political impact. These considerations lead to the following natural problems:
• to identify suitable tools to estimate the risk of a lender's bankruptcy (as in the subprime mortgage crisis, which originated); • to have quantitative tools, relying on reliable prediction of realistic models, which would allow the regulation authority to prevent abuses; • to provide optimal strategies in the management of sovreign debts. In [12] , the authors introduced a variational model where a government issues nominal defaultable debt and chooses fiscal and monetary policy under discretion. In particular, to reduce the actual size of the debt, the government can choose to devaluate its currency, producing inflaction and thus increasing the welfare cost and negatively affecting the trust of the investors, or to rely only on fiscal policy to serve the debt. The government can also declare the default, which imply to pay a bankruptcy cost due to the temporary exclusion from capital markets, and a drop in the output endowment. The aim is to find a strategy minimizing a cost functional dealing with the trade-off between inflaction, social costs, and debt sustainability and possibly declaring the default if this option would me preferable to continue servicing the debt.
The analysis of the model in [12] was performed by a numerical methods, and as a final conclusion of their analysis, the authors claim that the tool of currency devaluation, though useful in a short-term perspective, is not recommended unless the government is able to make credible commitments about their future inflaction policy. In this sense, it is worth of notice that many countries with limited inflaction credibility, decide either to issue bonds directly in a foreign stable currency (e.g., US dollars), or delegates the monetary policy to an independent authority with a strong anti-inflaction commitment (e.g., Eurozone Central Bank).
An analytical study of a variant of the model in [12] was performed in [5] , in the case where no currency devaluation is available to the governement, and provided a semi-explicit formula for the optimal strategy in the deterministic case (i.e., when the GDP evolves deterministically).
This paper aims to develop the analytical study of the model in [5] , allowing also the possibility of currency devaluation as in [12] .
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the stochastic model together with the main assumptions, in Section 3 we prove the existence of an equilibrium solution for the stochastic model as the steady state of an auxiliary parabolic system, and study its asymptotic behaviour as the maximum debt-to-income threshold is pushed to +∞. In Section 4 we study the deterministic model obtaining by setting the volatility σ = 0. In this case we provide a semi-explicit construction for an equilibrium solution, together with a study of its asymptotic behaviour as the maximum debt-to-income threshold is pushed to +∞.
A model with stochastic growth
In this section, we develop the model in [5] , allowing the possibility of currency devaluation as in [12] . Here the borrower is a sovereign state, that can decide to devaluate its currency (for example, printing more paper money). The total income Y , i.e., the gross national product GDP measured in terms of the floating currency unit, can quickly increase if the currency is devaluated, producing inflation. It is governed by a stochastic process
dY (t) = (µ + v(t))Y (t) dt + σY (t) dW
where W is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space and
• µ = average growth rate of the economy;
• σ = the volatility;
• v(t) ≥ 0 = the devaluation rate at time t, regarded as an additional control. We refer to [12] for a more detailed derivation v in the above system from economic primitives.
Let X(t) be the outstanding stock of nominal government bonds, expressed in the local currency unit. In particular, X(t) represents also the total nominal value of the outstanding debt. To service the debt, the government trades a nominal non-contingent bond with risk-neutral competitive foreign investors. In case of bankruptcy, the lenders recover only a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of their outstanding capital, depending on the total amount of the debt at the time of bankruptcy. To offset this possible loss, the buys a bond with unit nominal value at a discounted price p ∈ [0, 1]. We denote by U (t) the rate of payments that the borrower chooses to make to the lenders at time t. If this amount is not enough to cover the running interest and pay back part of the principal, new bonds are issued, at the discounted price p(t). As in [5] , the nominal value of the outstanding debt thus evolves according toẊ (t) = −λX(t) + (λ + r)X(t) − U (t) p(t) .
Here the constants • λ = rate at which the borrower pays back the principal;
• r = discount rate .
The debt-to-GDP ratio (DTI) is defined as x = X/Y . By Itō's formula [13, 14] , the evolution of x(·) is
where u = U/Y ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the total income allocated to reduce the debt. Throughout the following we will assume that r > µ.
In this model, the borrower has three controls: at each time t he can decide the portion u(t) of the total income is allocated to repaying the debt, he can decide the devaluation rate v(t) and he can also decide the time T b he is going to declare bankruptcy, paying a bankruptcy cost. More precisely, we assume that
• there exists a threshold x * > 0 such that if x(t) reaches x * then the borrower is forced to declare bankruptcy; • the borrower decides to declare bankruptcy as soon as x(t) reaches x ′ , where x ′ ∈ [0, x * ] is an additional control parameter, chosen by the borrower in order to minimize his expected cost; • the optimal control has feedback form, so that
where u * ∈ U := {u : [0,
In this case the random variable bankruptcy time is
and the total expected cost to the borrower, exponentially discounted in time, is
• B is the bankruptcy cost, which summarizes the penalties of temporary exclusion from the capital markets, the bad reputation among the investors, and the social costs of the default;
• c(v) is a social cost resulting by devaluation, i.e., the increasing cost of the welfare and of the imported goods; • L(u) is the cost for the borrower to implement the control u, i.e., adversion toward austerity policies and welfare's budget cuts. By a Dynamic Programming argument, it is never convenient for the borrower to declare bankruptcy unless he is not forced to do so, i.e., unless the threshold x * is reached. This argument is a slight variant of [5] .
Lemma 2.1. For any admissible control strategy (u ′ (·), v ′ (·)) declaring bankruptcy at x = x ′ < x * , there exists a control strategy with smaller cost declaring bankruptcy at x = x * .
Proof. By contradiction, assume that the borrower implement any strategy and decide to declare bankruptcy when reaching x = x ′ < x * . Denote by T the time when he declares bankruptcy and let J be the cost of this strategy up to time T . The total cost is then J + e −rT B. We can construct a better strategy simply avoiding to declare bankruptcy at x ′ , and switching off the controls (u * , v * ) after having reached x ′ until the threshold x * is reached. In this case, the total cost before T is the same as before, and the total cost is
Thus from now on we assume that the borrower will declare bankruptcy exactly at time t = T * b . Moreover, the goal of the borrower is to (2.3) minimize:
To complete the model, we need an equation determining the discounted bond price p in the evolution equation (2.1). For every x > 0, let θ(x) be the salvage rate, i.e. the fraction of the outstanding capital that can be recovered by lenders, if bankruptcy occurs when the debt has size x * . As in [5] , assuming that the investors are risk-neutral, the discounted bond price coincides with the expected payoff to a lender purchasing a coupon with unit nominal value
Having described the model, we can introduce the definition of optimal solution, in feedback form. Definition 2.2 (Stochastic optimal feedback solution). In connection with the above model, we say that a triple of functions u = u * (x), v = v * (x) p = p(x) provides an optimal solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.4) if (i) Given the function p(·), for every initial value x 0 ∈ [0, x * ] the feedback control (u * (·), v * (·)) with stopping time T * b as in (2.2) provides an optimal solution to the stochastic control problem (2.3), with dynamics (2.1).
(ii) Given the feedback control u * (·) and the set S, for every initial value x 0 the discounted price p(x 0 ) satisfies (2.4), where T * b is the stopping time (2.2) determined by the dynamics (2.1).
The value function of the control system (2.1) with the cost J in (2.3) is defined by
In the following we shall assume that
The implementing cost function L is twice continuously differentiable for u ∈ [0, 1[ and satisfies
(A2) The social cost c(·) determined by currency devaluation is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
for some constant δ 0 > 0.
Calling B a fixed (large) cost associated with bankruptcy, under the above assumptions, we have
Denote by
the Legendre transform of L and c. By the strict convexity of L and c, for every ρ there exist unique u ρ ∈ [0, 1] and v ρ ≥ 0 such that L * (ρ) + L(u ρ ) = ρu ρ and c * (ρ) + c(v ρ ) = ρv ρ . They can be characterized by the relations
The Hamiltonian associated to the dynamics (2.1) and the cost functions L, c in (2.3) is
The necessary conditions for optimality imply that the value function V should solve the second order implicit ODE (2.9)
and the feedback strategies, by (A1) and (A2), are
On the other hand, if the feedback controls u = u * (x) and v = v * (x) are known, then by using Feynman-Kac formula, we obtain the second order nonlinear ODE for the discounted bond price p in (2.4)
with boundary values p(0) = 1, p(x * ) = θ(x * ). Recalling 2.8 and (2.10), a direct computation yields (2.13)
and (2.14)
Combining (2.9)-(2.13), we are thus led to the system of second order implicit ODEs (2.15)
with the boundary conditions
In the next section, an optimal feedback solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.4) will be obtained by solving the above system of ODEs for the value function V (·) and for the discounted bond price p(·).
We close this section by collecting some useful properties of the Hamiltonian function. As in [5] , the followings holds:
(2) for every x, p > 0 the map ξ → H(x, ξ, p) is concave down and satisfies
and so
thus, recalling that by assumption we have L ′′ (u) ≥ δ 0 and c ′′ (v) ≥ δ 0 for 0 < u < 1 and v ≥ 0, we obtain
We recall this general fact: assume that f : I → R is a C 2 convex strictly increasing function defined on a real interval I, and satisfying f ′′ ≥ δ > 0. Then, denoted by g its inverse function, g : f (I) → I, we have that g is 1/2-Hölder continuous. Indeed, let x 1 , x 2 ∈ f −1 (I) with x 1 ≤ x 2 , and set y 1 = g(x 1 ) and y 2 = g(x 2 ).
since f is strictly increasing, f ′′ (s) ≥ δ, and y 1 ≤ y 2 . Thus if x 2 ≥ x 1 we have
By switching the roles of x 2 and x 1 , the same holds true if x 1 ≥ x 2 .
In our case, set f (·) = − 1 r H(x, ·, p), we have
To conclude the proof is enough to choose
3. Stochastic optimal feedback solutions 3.1. Existence of optimal feedback solutions. In this subsection, we prove the existence of an optimal feedback solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)-(2.4) for a given bankruptcy threshold x * . It is well-known (see Theorem 4.1, p.149, in [9] or Theorem 11.2.2, p. 141, in [13] ) that if (V, p) is a solution to the boundary value problem (2.15)-(2.16), then a standard result in the theory of stochastic optimization implies that the feedback control (u * (·), v * (·)) in (2.10) is optimal for the problem (2.3) with dynamics (2.1).
Let x * > 0 be given. We shall construct a solution of (2.15)-(2.16) by considering the auxiliary parabolic system (3.1)
In particular, we have
Following [2] , the main idea is to construct a compact, convex set of functions (V, p) :
for some positive constant θ min which is positively invariant for the parabolic evolution problem. A topological technique will then yield the existence of a steady state, i.e. a solution to (3.1)-(3.2).
Theorem 3.1. In addition to (A1)-(A2), assume that σ > 0, θ(x * ) > 0 and
Then there exists a positive constant θ min such that the system of second order ODEs (2.15)
Moreover, the function V is monotone increasing and
As a consequence, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 3.2.
Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.1, the debt management problem (2.3) with dynamics (2.1) admits an optimal feedback solution.
Proof. The proof follows the same line of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [5] . It is divided into several steps:
1. Let's introduce the following functions
From (A1)-(A2) and (3.4), one has that
For any 0 < ε < r − µ λ + µ , consider the parabolic system
together with the boundary conditions (3.2), which is obtained from (3.1) by adding the terms εV xx , εp xx on the right hand sides. For any ε > 0 this makes the system uniformly parabolic also in a neighborhood of x = 0.
Recalling Theorem 1 in [2]
, the system (3.7), coupled with the initial conditions
, with initial data (3.7). Consider the closed, convex set of functions
, and (2.16) holds , where the constant
We claim that the above domain is positively invariant under the semigroup S t , namely
Let us now consider the constant functions
Recalling Lemma 2.3 (2), we have [5] , one can easily to check that V + is a supersolution and V − is a subsolution of the first scalar parabolic equation in (3.7). Moreover, p + is a supersolution and p − is a subsolution of the second scalar parabolic equation in (3.7). Therefore, for any
, then for every t ≥ 0 the solution of the system (3.7) will satisfy
3.
Thanks to the bounds of Lemma 2.3 (1) and (3.6) we can now apply Theorem 3 in [2] and obtain the existence of a steady state (V ε , p ε ) ∈ D for the system (3.7).
(3.10)
Assume by a contradiction that V ε is not monotone increasing. Then there exists
This implies that
Thus, (2.8) yields
and it yields a contradiction.
4.
It now remains to derive a priori estimate on this stationary solution, which will allow to take the limit as ε → 0. Let us first provide upper bounds for
In particular, this implies that for any
ε (x)) < 0 , and it yields a contradiction to the first equation in (3.10).
On the other hand, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a pointx ∈ [x 1 , x * ] where
By Gronwall's inequalities, from the above differential inequality and the estimate (3.13), one obtains a uniform bound on
for some M * which does not depend on ε. As a consequence, (3.11) implies that
5. For any fixed 0 < δ < x * , we first provide uniform bounds on
and
for all x ∈ [0, x * ]. Thus, the first equation in (3.10) yields
Moreover, the second equation in (3.10) implies that
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a pointx
From (3.18), the Gronwall's lemma yields
On the other hand, recalling (2.8), (2.10), (2.13) and (3.14), we obtain that H and
are also uniformly bounded and uniformly Lipschitz on [δ, x * ].
6. By choosing a suitable subsequence, we achieve the uniform convergence 
In order to show that lim x→0+ p(x) = 1, one needs to provide a lower bound on p ε in a neighborhood of x = 0, independent of ε. Let's introduce the constant 
and it yields lim x→0+ p(x) = 0.
3.2.
Dependence on the bankruptcy threshold x * . In this subsection, we will study the behavior of the expected total cost for servicing when the maximum size x * of the debt, at which bankruptcy is declared, becomes very large. More precisely, for a given x * , let p(·, x * ) be a solution to the system of second order ODEs (2.15) with boundary conditions (3.2). We investigate whether, as x * → ∞, the value function V (·, x * ) remains positive or approaches zero uniformly on bounded sets.
Theorem 3.3. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.1, the followings hold:
Proof. 1. Fixed x * , let p(x, x * ) and V (x, * ) be the solution to (2.15) with boundary conditions (3.2). Denote by
With the same argument in steps 2-5 in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we obtain that
and V (·, x * ) is increasing. Moreover, there exists M * > 0 depending on x * such that
We will construct upper and lower bounds for V (·, x * ), p(·, x * ), in the form
where • for any V (·, ·) with V x ≥ 0, the functions p 1 (·) and p 2 (·) are a subsolution and a supersolution of the second equation in (2.15), respectively.
• for any p(·, ·) with p ∈ [0, 1] and p x ≤ 0, the function V 1 (·) and V 2 (·) are a supersolution and a subsolution of the first equation in (2.15), respectively. Toward this goal, we introduce the constants
Let us prove (i). Suppose that
Fix x * > 0, let us construct a suitable pair of functions V 1 , p 1 . Two cases are considered:
be the solution to the backward Cauchy problem
Solving the above ODE, we obtain that
A direct computation yields
Thus, from (2.3) (1), it holds for all q ≥ γ that
This implies that
and thus V 1 is a super-solution of the first equation in (2.15). A standard comparison arguments yields
• If θ(x * ) < γ then let (p 1 , V 1 ) be the solution to the backward Cauchy problem
This solution satisfies that p 1 is strictly decreasing,
Using (3.26) and (3.27) one obtains
Since,p 1 is strictly decreasing, we then obtain thatp ′′ 1 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, x * ) and thus
Thus, from Lemma 2.3 (1), it holds
On the other hand, recallingx 0 = c ′ (0) M * in (3.22), letp 1 be the solution of the backward Cauchy problem
As in the previous step, one obtains thatp 1 is decreasing, lim x→0+p1 (x) = 1 and
Let us define
One has that
Recalling that v(x, x * ) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x 0 ], (3.28) and (3.29) implies that 
Next, differentiating both sides of the first ODE in (3.26), we obtain
and Lemma 2.3 (1) yields
From (2.14), the map p → H(x, ξ, p) is monotone decreasing when ξ ≥ 0 and
For any x ∈ (0,x 1 ), it holds
For any x ∈ (x 1 , x * ), from (3.32) and (3.31), one gets
Hence, V 1 (x) is a super-solution of the first equation in (2.15). A standard comparison arguments yields
From (3.25) and (3.33), we finally obtain that
and it yields (3.20).
Let us prove (ii). Suppose that
On the other hand, recalling (2.13), we get
for all x ∈ (x 2 , x * ). Therefore, p 2 (·) is a super-solution of the first equation in (2.15) and
Next, set
For x * ≥x 3 , we define
For every x ∈ (0,x 3 ), V 2 (x) = 0 and
For every x ∈ (x 2 , x * ), we have
Recalling (3.34), we get
Since V 2 (0) = V (x, x * ) and V 2 (x * ) < B = V (x, * ), together with (3.36), the function V 2 is a sub-solution of the first equation in (2.15) and
Letting x * to +∞, we obtain (3.21).
The deterministic case σ = 0
In the case σ = 0, the stochastic control system (2.1) reduces to the deterministic one
Here the control u(t) is assumed to be in [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0.
Throughout the paper, we always assume r > µ. The deterministic Debt Management Problem can be formulated as follows.
(DMP) Given an initial value x(0) = x 0 ∈ [0, x * ] of the DTI, minimize
subject to the dynamics (4.1), where the bankruptcy time T b is defined as in (2.2), while the discount bond price
Since in this case the optimal feedback control u * , v * and the corresponding functions V * , p * may not be smooth, a concept of equilibrium solution should be more carefully defined.
Definition 4.1 (Equilibrium solution in feedback form).
A couple of piecewise Lipschitz continuous functions (u * (·), v * (·)) and p * (·) provide an equilibrium solution to the debt management problem (DMP), with continuous value function V * (·), if (i) For every x 0 ∈ [0, x * ], V * is the minimum cost for the optimal control problem (4.4) minimize:
Moreover, every Carathéodory solution of (4.5) with (u(t), v(t)) = (u * (x(t)), v * (x(t))) is optimal. (ii) For every x 0 ∈ [0, x * ], there exists at least one solution t → x(t) of the Cauchy problem
with T b as in (2.2).
In the deterministic case, (2.15) becomes the following implicit system of the first order ODEs (4.8)
with the boundary conditions (4.9)
The Hamiltonian function (2.8) reduces to (4.10) H(x, ξ, p) . = min
For further use, we compute the gradient of the Hamiltonian function H(·)
where for x > 0 and p ∈]0, 1] we have
The following Lemma will catch some relevant properties of H(·) needed to study the system (4.8).
Lemma 4.2. Let x ≥ 0 and 0 < p ≤ 1 be fixed, and set
H(x, ξ, p).
• admits exactly two distinct solutions {F − (x, η, p), F + (x, η, p)} with
we extend the definition of η → F ± (x, η, p) by setting
thus for fixed x > 0 , p ∈]0, 1], the maps η → F − (x, η, p) and η → F + (x, η, p) are respectively striclty increasing and strictly decreasing in [0, H max (x, p)]. (3) for all 0 < η < H max (x, p) with x > 0 and p ∈]0, 1], we have 
Proof.
Since for all fixed x > 0, 0 < p ≤ 1 we have that ξ → H(x, ξ, p) is the minimum of a family of affine functions of ξ, we have that the map ξ → H(x, ξ, p) is concave down. For all x > 0, 0 < p ≤ 1 we have
we have that ξ → H ξ (x, ξ, p) vanishes in at most one point in [0, +∞), so ξ → H(x, ξ, p) reaches its maximum value H max (x, p) on [0, +∞) at a unique point ξ ♯ (x, p), moreover it is strictly increasing for 0 < ξ < ξ ♯ (x, p) and strictly decreasing for ξ > ξ ♯ (x, p). We define the strictly increasing map η → F − (x, η, p), for 0 < η < H max (x, p), to be the inverse of ξ → 1 r H(x, ξ, p) for 0 < ξ < ξ ♯ . Similarly, we define the strictly decreasing map η → F + (x, η, p), for 0 < η < H max (x, p), to be the inverse of ξ →
Recalling (4.11), we have
For any fixed x ≥ 0 and 0 < p ≤ 1, given η > 0 we consider the equation rη = H(x, ξ, p), and all the statements follows by applying F ± (x, ·, p) to it. To prove item (4), we notice that d dp
Definition 4.3 (Normal form of the system). Given x > 0, 0 < p ≤ 1, 0 < rη ≤ H max (x, p) we define the maps
Notice that if rV (x) > H max (x, p), then the first equation of (4.8) has no solution. Other-
Remark 4.4. Recalling (4.1) and (4.13), we observe that
• The value V ′ (x) = F + (x, V (x), p) ≥ ξ ♯ (x, p) corresponds to the choice of an optimal control such thatẋ(t) < 0. The total debt-to-ratio is descreasing.
corresponds to the choice of an optimal control such thatẋ(x) > 0. The total debt-to-ratio is increasing.
corresponds to the unique control strategy such thatẋ(t) = 0.
Remark 4.5. We notice that if 0 ≤ xξ < min{xpL ′ (0), c ′ (0)}, since u * = v * = 0, we have x, ξ) ) .
Construction of a solution.
We will begin our analysis from the control strategies keeping the DTI constant in time, i.e., such that the corresponding solution x(·) of (4.1) is constant. In this case, there is no bankruptcy risk, i.e., T b = +∞.
Definition 4.6 (Constant strategies). Letx > 0 be given. We say that a couple (ū,v)
where the second relation comes from taking T b = +∞ in (4.3).
From these equations, if a couple (ū,v) ∈ [0, 1[×[0, +∞[ is a constant strategy then it holds (r + λ)(r − µ)x = (r + λ +v)ū. In this case, the borrower will never go bankrupt and thus the cost of this strategy in (4.2) is computed by
We notice that ifx(r − µ) > 1, we must havev > 1 andp < 1, in particular if DTI is sufficiently large, every constant strategy needs to implement currency devaluation, with a consequently drop of p. A more precise estimate will be provided in Proposition 4.9.
We are now interested in the minimum cost of a strategy keeping the debt constant. To this aim, we first characterize the cost of a constant strategy in terms of the variables x, p. 
Moreover, (û,v) realizes the minimum in the right hand side of (4.17) if and only if
, and Λ = −xp. By standard argument in convex analysis (see e.g. Theorem 4.2 and Remark 4.2 p. 60 of [7] ), denoted by f * , g * the convex conjugates of f, g respectively, we have
Moreover, since sup ξ∈R H(x, ξ, p) is attained only at ξ = ξ ♯ (x, p) according to the strict concavity of ξ → H(x, ξ, p), (û,v) realizes the minimum in the right hand side of (4.17) if and only if
The second relation can be rewritten as
Formula (4.17) allows us to give a simpler characterization of the minimum cost of a strategy keeping the debt-to-income ratio constant in time. Indeed, given x ∈ [0, x * ], we select (u(x), v(x)) keeping the debt-to-income ratio constant in time. This defines uniquely a value p = p(x) by Definition 4.6 and impose a relation between u(x) and v(x). Then we take the minimum over all the costs of such strategies, i.e., the right hand side of formula (4.17). This naturally leads to the following definition. 
where
For every x ∈ [0, x * ], W (x) denotes the minimum cost of a strategy keeping the DTI ratio constant in time.
The next results proves that if the debt-to-income ratio is sufficiently small, the optimal strategy keeping it constant does not use the devaluation of currency. Proposition 4.9 (Non-devaluating regime for optimal constant strategies). Let x c ≥ 0 be the unique solution of the following equation in x
• for every x ∈]0, x * [ we have
Proof. Given x ∈]0, x * [, we define the convex function
We compute
which is monotone increasing and satisfies lim
Two cases may occur: 
and it implies W (x) = 1 r · L((r − µ)x) and p c (x) = 1.
• If we have min{x c , x * } < x ≤ x * , then there exists a unique point v c (x) > 0 such that F ′ (v c (x)) = 0, and this point is characterized by
The remaining statements follows noticing that for min{x c , x * } < x ≤ x * we have
and deriving the explicit expression of W (x) for [0, min{x c , x * }] yields the same formula. Notice that, by (4.14), we have
where we used the fact that L ′ is strictly increasing and, since the argument of L ′ must be nonnegative, we have
We pass now to study the properties of the backward solution. We will construct an equilibrium solution of 4.8 by a suitable concatenation of backward solutions. Definition 4.10 (Backward solution for x * ). Let x → (Z(x, x * ), q(x, x * )) be the backward solution of the system of ODEs
The following Lemma states some basic properties of the backward solution. In particular, the backward solution Z(·, x * ), starting from B at x * with W (x * ) < B, survives backward at least until the first intersection with the graph of W (·). Moreover, in this interval is monotone increasing and positive. In the same way, q(·, x * ) is always in ]0, 1].
Proposition 4.11. [Basic properties of the backward solution] Set
.
Denote by I x * ⊆ [0, x * ] the maximal domain of the backward equation (4.20), define y(x) to be the maximal solution of
y(x * ) = 0, and let J x * the intersection of its domain with [0,
1. We first claim that q(·, x * ) is non-increasing on J x * ]x * W , x * [ and thus (4.22)
By contradiction, assume that there exists
This yields
Two cases are considered:
Thus, q(x 1 , x * ) = 1 and
This implies that q(x, x * ) = 1 for all x ∈ J x * ∩]x * W , x * [ with x ≤ x 1 . In particular, we have q ′′ (x 1 , x * ) = 0, which yields a contradiction.
• If
From the first equation of (4.8) and (4.11), it holds
Observe that Z ′ (x 1 , x * ) > 0 and H ξ (x 1 , Z ′ (x 1 , x * ), q(x 1 , x * )) > 0, one obtains that
Taking the derivative respect to x in both sides of the second equation of (4.8), we have
Recalling (4.23), we obtain that
Now assume that there exists
Moreover,
On the other hand, since q(
, we estimate
Thus,
By construction, y(·)
is strictly monotone and invertible in ]x * W , x * ], let x = x(y) be its inverse, from the inverse function theorem we get
Since the map ξ → H(x, ξ, q) is concave, it holds
and this yields Z(x, x * ) ≥ Be ry(x) > 0 for all
With a similar argument for q(·, x * ), we obtain
which in particular implies that for all
and so q(x, x * ) ∈]0, 1] for all x ∈]x * W , x * ].
As far as the graph of Z(·, x * ) intersects the graph of W (·), we have that Z(·, x * ) is no longer optimal. We investigate now the local behavior of Z(·, x * ) and W (·) near to an intersection of their graphs. 
Proof. Let {x j } j∈N ⊆ I be a sequence converging tox and qx ∈ [0, 1] be such that qx = lim sup
. By assumption, we have
Recalling Lemma 4.2 (4), we have p c (x) ≥ qx. By Proposition 4.9, we have W ′ (x) < ξ ♯ (x, p c (x)), and so
thus, by applying the strictly increasing map F − (x, ·, p c (x)) on both sides, we obtain
On the other hand, since the functions F − (x, Z, q) and G − (x, Z, q) are smooth for H ξ (x, Z, q) = 0 but not only Hölder continuous with respect to Z near to the surface
Thus, for any x 0 ∈ [0, x * ), the definition of the solution of the Cauchy problem
requires some care.
For any ε > 0, we denote by Z ε (·, x 0 ), q ε (·, x 0 ) the backward solution to (4.25) with the terminal data
With the same argument in the proof of proposition 4.11, this solution is uniquely defined on a maximal interval [a ε (x 0 ),
Let x ♭ be the unique solution to the equation
It is clear that 0 < x ♭ < x c where x c is defined in Proposition 4.9 as the unique solution to the equaiton (r + λ)c
• CASE 1: For any x 0 ∈ (0, x ♭ ], we claim that
and Z ε (·, x 0 ) solves backward the following ODE
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Indeed, let Z 1 be the unique backward solution of (4.27). From (4.14), it holds
for all x ∈ (0, x ♭ ]. As in [5] A contradiction argument yields
Thus, Z 1 is well-defined on [0, x 0 ] and Z 1 (0) = 0. On the other hand, it holds
for all x ≤ x ♭ and (4.26) implies that
Therefore, (Z 1 (x), 1) solves (4.25) and the uniqueness yields
Thanks to the monotone increasing property of the map
is the unique solution of (4.25). If the initial size of the debt isx ∈ [0, x 0 ] we think of Z(x, x 0 ) is as the expected cost of (4.4)-(4.5) with p(·, x 0 ) = 1, x(0) = x 0 achieved by the feedback strategies (4.28) u(x, x 0 ) = argmin
for all x ∈ [0, x 0 ]. With this strategy, the debt has the asymptotic behavior x(t) → x 0 as t → ∞.
• CASE 2: For x 0 ∈ (x ♭ , x * W ], system of ODEs (4.25) does not admit a unique solution in general since it is not monotone, it. The following lemma will provide the existence result of (4.25) for all x 0 ∈ (x ♭ , x * W ]. Lemma 4.13. There exists a constant δ ♭ > 0 depending only on x ♭ such that for any
for some ε 0 > 0 sufficiently small.
Proof. From (4.19) and (4.14), it holds
By continuity of the map
, one can find a constant ε 1 > 0 sufficiently small such that
On the other hand, the continuity of W ′ yields
For a fixed ε ∈ (0, ε 1 ), denote by
Recalling that the function
Since q ε (·, x 0 ) is decreasing, it holds
and (4.29)-(4.30) yield
On the other hand, from (4.11) one shows that the map x → F − (x, η, p) is monotone decreasing and thus
Observe that the map η → F − (x, η, p) is Hölder continuous due to Lemma 2.4. More precisely, there exist a constant C x ♭ > 0 such that
Recalling (4.31), we have
and it yields
Therefore,
Remark 4.14. In general, the backward Cauchy problem (4.25) may admits more than one solution.
As a consequence of Lemma 4.13 , there exists a sequence {ε n } n≥0 → 0+ such that {(Z εn (·, x 0 ), q εn (·, x 0 ))} n≥1 converges to (Z(·, x 0 ), q(·, x 0 )) which is a solution of (4.25). With the same argument in the proof of proposition 4.11, we can extend backward the solution (Z(·,
and Lemma 4.12 yields lim x→a(x 0 )+ q(a(x 0 ), x 0 ) ≤ p c (a(x 0 )). If the initial size of the debt isx ∈ [a(x 0 ), x 0 ] we think of Z(x, x 0 ) is as the expected cost of (4.4)-(4.5) with p(·, x 0 ), x(0) = x 0 achieved by the feedback strategies (4.33)
With this strategy, the debt has the asymptotic behavior x(t) → x 0 as t → ∞.
We are now ready to to construct an equilibrium solution in the feedback form by a suitable concatenation of backward solutions. By induction, we define a family of back solutions as follows:
and x n+1 . = a(x n ), (Z(x, x n ), q(x, x n )) for all x ∈ [x n+1 , x n ] .
From Case 1 and Lemma 4.13, there exists a natural number N 0 < 1 + x * − x ♭ δ x ♭ such that our construction will be stop in N 0 step, i.e., Then we restart by solving backward the system with the new terminal conditions (W (x 1 ), p c (x 1 )), until the next touch with the graph of W at (x 2 , W (x 2 )) and so on. In a finite number of steps we reach the origin. If a touch occurs at x n 0 < x ♭ then the backward solution from x n 0 reaches the origin with q ≡ 1. Given an initial valuex of the DTI, if 0 ≤ x n+1 <x < x n < x 1 the the optimal strategy let the DTI increase asymptotically to x n (no banktuptcy), while if x 1 <x < x * then the optimal strategy let the DTI increase to x * , thus providing bankruptcy in finite time.
We will show that a feedback equilibrium solution to the debt management problem is obtained as follows Then the function V * , p * , u * and v * provide an equilibrium solution to the debt management problem (4.1)-(4.3), in feedback form.
Proof. From the monotone increasing property of the maps p → F − (x * , W (x * ), p), η → F − (x * , η, θ(x * )) and ξ → v * (x * , ξ), we have θ(x * ) · (r + λ + v * (x * , F − (x * , B, θ(x * )))
< p c (x * ) · (r + λ + v * (x * , F − (x * , W (x * ), p c (x * ))) = r + λ and it yields (4.21). By Proposition 4.11 and Lemma 4.13, a pair V * (·), p * (·) in (4.34) is well-defined on [0, x * ]. In the remaining steps, we show that V * , p * , u * , v * provide an equilibrium solution. Namely, they satisfy the properties (i)-(ii) in Definition 4.1. At any Lebesgue point t of u(·) and v(·), recalling that (V * , p * ) solves the system (4.8), we compute d dt φ u,v (t) = e −rt · L(u(t)) + c(v(t)) − rV * (x(t)) + (V * ) ′ (x(t)) ·ẋ(t)
= e −rt · L(u(t)) + c(v(t)) − rV * (x(t)) + (V * ) ′ (x(t)) λ + r p * (x(t)) − λ − µ − v(t) x(t) − u(t) p * (x(t)) ≥ e −rt · min
′ (x(t))x(t) ζ + λ + r p * (x(t)) − λ − µ x(t)(V * ) ′ (x(t)) − rV * (x(t)) = e −rt · H x(t), (V * ) ′ (x(t)), p * (x(t)) − rV * (x(t)) = 0. 
It remains to check (ii).
The case x 0 = 0 is trivial. Two main cases will be considered. Thus, (4.53) holds and the increasing property of V (·, x * ) yields (4.42).
